The First Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal held that local rent control laws can apply to individual rooms rented in a single-family home.

Jonathan Owens owns a single-family home in Oakland. He rents out three of the bedrooms in this home to separate tenants on a month-to-month basis, terminable upon 60 days’ notice. Each tenant has their own private room, and the common areas of the house are shared between the tenants and Owens.

One of the tenants filed a petition with the Oakland Residential Rent and Relocation Board alleging that her housing became uninhabitable due to disruptive construction work in the house. She also alleged that Owens retaliated against her by terminating her lease when she complained about the construction work. Owens argued that the Board has no jurisdiction over the matter because under state law his single-family home is exempt from local rent control regulations. The Board found otherwise and determined that he had transformed his single-family home into a multi-unit building, and therefore the Board’s rent control regulations were applicable.

Under California’s Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Civil Code Section 1954.5 et seq.), local jurisdictions have the authority to enact rent control under certain conditions. However, under the Act single-family homes are generally exempt from local rent control. Owens sued the Board arguing that because his property is a single-family home the local Board has no jurisdiction. The trial court found otherwise, and Owens appealed.

Civil Code Section 1954.52 exempts single-family homes from local rent control because single-family homes are generally single units, “alienable and separate” from title to any other dwelling unit (Civil Code Section 1954.52(3)(A)). Rent control under the Act generally only applies to multi-unit structures. But the Appeals Court held that because Owens chose to rent out rooms separately to multiple people, he transformed his single unit dwelling into a multi-unit dwelling.

The Appeals Court noted that a dwelling unit is not necessarily the entire property to which an owner holds title, instead it is an area inhabited by someone to the exclusion of others. Citing the trial court, the Appeals Court noted that the relevant dwelling unit is not the house as a whole, but each of the rooms he rented out to tenants. Therefore, the Appeals Court agreed with the trial court and held that the individual rooms that Owens rented out to individual tenants are not exempt from the Board’s rent control and jurisdiction over the matter.

The American Civil Liberties Union has sued the City of Pomona for improperly training its police officers on the new legal standard for justifiable use of deadly force enacted by 2019’s Assembly Bill 392. AB 392, which was sponsored by the ACLU, changed the standard for use of deadly force in California, now codified in Penal Code section 835a.

According to the ACLU’s complaint, Pomona, relying on advice from Lexipol and the Peace Officers Research Association of California, incorrectly instructed its officers that AB 392 did not meaningfully change the use of deadly force standard. Lexipol is a private company that drafts policies for many police agencies in California, and the Peace Officers Research Association is a law enforcement lobby. The ACLU argues these private special interests successfully and improperly influenced Pomona’s use of force policy such that it misstates the law as amended by AB 392. At bottom, though, this lawsuit is an attempt to determine whether AB 392 really did raise the threshold for use of deadly force.

The “reasonable officer” standard in place before AB 392 was developed in case law stemming from Graham v. Connor. The United States Supreme Court derived the standard from the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from unreasonable seizures of the person. According to the Supreme Court, “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘ “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” ’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” “Reasonableness” is “not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” Instead, it “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Most importantly, “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

The authors of AB 392 clearly intended to include the “reasonable officer” standard. However, the ACLU, relying on Senate Rules Committee statements, asserts it was AB 392’s intent to “exceed the standards articulated and set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Graham and” Tennessee v. Garner. The ACLU’s own argument in favor of AB 392’s passage states the bill “will replace the lax standard currently set by California law and the U.S. Constitution that police officers can use deadly force whenever ‘reasonable,’ and replace it with a more stringent standard that appropriately authorizes police officers to use deadly force only when necessary to defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.”

It is quite possible these policy statements will matter little to the appellate judges who determine how the word “necessary” should be interpreted. The plain text of the statute controls, and it reflects the legislature’s intent to maintain the “reasonable officer” standard throughout the statute.  For example, the law states that “it is the intent of the Legislature that peace officers use deadly force only when necessary in defense of human life. In determining whether deadly force is necessary, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of the particular circumstances of each case, and shall use other available resources and techniques if reasonably safe and feasible to an objectively reasonable officer.” The law also states that “a peace officer is justified in using deadly force upon another person only when the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, that such force is necessary … [t]o defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person” or to apprehend a fleeing felon “if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless immediately apprehended.”

Yet the Legislature did add the word “necessary” to the statute. The “reasonable officer” standard persists, but in the context of “necessary” force. The court must now interpret this statutory language in its totality. Until then, the more immediate question is how closely a police department’s use of force policy aligns with the standard in Penal Code section 835a. A policy that does not track the new standard may be susceptible to challenge.

We can expect the ACLU to continue to advocate its interpretation of the law to the courts and to the public. We will continue to monitor this lawsuit, so stay tuned!

In Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit found the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause applies to Los Angeles’ parking fines. Following Timbs v. Indiana, a recent SCOTUS decision that applied the excessive fine clause against the states, Pimentel extends the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines to routine municipal fines. The Court upheld a decision that a $63 parking fine was not grossly disproportionate to the offense of parking too long. Pimentel leaves open the possibility that a person could plead financial hardship on a case-by-case basis.

In a concurring opinion, Judge Bennet argues the Eighth Amendment should not apply to parking fines at all. He argues “Cities that meter on-street parking may … be acting in a similar capacity as the owner of a private parking garage” and therefore, like a private landlord, “may freely choose what rate it charges for parking, holdover and late fees included.” He worries “the potential for federal court litigation is endless,” and applying the Eighth Amendment to parking violations “trivializes” constitutional rights litigation. But because the parties did not dispute whether the Eighth Amendment applied, Judge Bennet concurred.

More challenges to various municipal fines are sure to follow.

Ben Franklin famously said: “When the well is dry, we know the worth of water.” Today’s Supreme Court decision in Wilde v. Dunsmuir is an important win for public utilities and local governments promising stability in local finance. [Disclosure: I argued the case for five local government associations.]

Specifically, it holds that water rates are not subject to referendum and, on the logic of the case, neither are other utility fees.

The decision is narrow, but significant. It holds that the referendum power created by article II, section 9 of California’s Constitution does not extend to “statutes providing for tax levies,” defining the latter term broadly to include most government revenues and not limiting it to “tax levies … for usual current expenses of the State.” That latter phrase limits “appropriations” but not “taxes.” It does not matter whether a government revenue measure funds a service (like water) that private parties also provide. It matters only that the service is an essential part of government’s operations. Water rates and other utility charges must still comply with the voter- and property-owner-approval processes of Proposition 218, and they remain subject to the initiative power, but not to referendum. This will help stabilize public finance, allow revenue bonds to issue without the risk of referendum repeal and, once bonds have issued, allow the contracts clauses of the State and federal Constitutions to protect rates from initiative repeal to the extent necessary to honor the debt.

This quote is the heart of the case: “Article II, section 9’s exemptions from referendum reflect a recognition that in certain areas, legislators must be permitted to act expediently, without the delays and uncertainty that accompany the referendum process.”

Along the way, Justice Kreuger, writing for a unanimous Court, made a number of other points worth noting:

  • The Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, among the proponents of Proposition 218, circulated an annotation of the initiative during the 1996 campaign. Public lawyers and taxpayer advocates have often cited it in arguments as to the meaning of the measure. But Wilde holds (in footnote 3) that this annotation is not authority to construe Proposition 218. It rejected Dunsmuir’s request for notice of the annotation as irrelevant but, significantly, cites with approval (i) a case holding the motive of initiative drafters is irrelevant to construing initiatives — it is the motives of voters that matter and (ii) Mission Springs Water District v. Verjil, which also held the HJTA annotation irrelevant because it was not in the ballot books voters received. The annotation will be a much less useful tool than previously.
  • The definition of “tax” — and by implications, the other definitions of Propositions 218 and 26 — do not apply to other constitutional provisions and specifically do not apply to the referendum provision of article II, section 9.
  • 1978’s Proposition 13 does not revise the entire field of tax law, and by implication, neither do 1996’s Proposition 218 and 2010’s Proposition 26. Therefore, they will be construed to avoid implied repeal of other constitutional provisions and earlier statutes.
  • Rossi v. San Francisco (a 1995 SCOCA decision) had uphold a San Francisco charter provision (that became a rule of Proposition 62 and Proposition 218) requiring voter approval of taxes concluding it did not require prohibited referenda on taxes. It was arguably inconsistent with Geiger v. Board of Supervisors (a 1957 SCOCA case) protecting local government revenues from referenda. The Court read Rossi narrowly, as about the initiative power only. This can be read as part of a larger trend of the current SCOCA resuscitating precedents from the era before the 1986 recall of 3 justices (which swung our courts to the right) and reading narrowly precedents from the intervening, conservative era.
  • The rationale of the exception from the referendum power for taxes is to avoid “interference with the administration of [government’s] fiscal powers and policies” and this explains the conclusion to include all government revenue measures which fund essential services within the “taxes” protected from referendum and not just those within the narrower, modern definition of that term provided by Propositions 218 and 26.
  • The Court noted that the rule protecting revenues that fund essential services from referendum “is related to, but distinct from, the rule we articulated and applied in Simpson v. Hite.” Simpson holds that one cannot use the initiative to challenge government actions which constitute essential government functions (there, siting a courthouse). Simpson has not often been cited in recent years because it reflects less judicial deference to the initiative power than is the current standard. This opinion recasts Simpson as holding that the initiative power cannot affect legislative acts that State legislation delegates to local government officials — not to their voters. This has the effect of conflating Simpson with Committee of Seven Thousand, a 1988 SCOCA case. That can be viewed as pro-direct democracy or as restating Simpson on a stronger, more modern footing. It might also reflect the current Court’s slightly greater willingness to review initiatives and referenda than were earlier courts. On that, time will tell.
  • In what is plainly dicta (i.e., not a precedential holding) the Court comments on how Dunsmuir might have responded to an adverse referendum result: “Perhaps the City could simply default to its prior rates while it restarts the process of ‘study[ing], plan[ning], and implement[ing] a new water rate master plan.” This may be helpful when an agency loses its rates to an initiative repeal or reduction and needs to do something to get money in the door while it makes new rates.
  • Water service is an essential government function, some other things are not, and the Court does not tell us much about how to draw the line. This rejects reasoning of the Court of Appeal’s decision in this case, which held that water service was not “essential.”
  • The Court expressly rejects a 1980 case which rejected an initiative change to Lompoc’s power rates. This is further support for the rule that ratemaking is legislation which exposes it to the initiative, but also provides for protective litigation rules, like the litigation-on-the-record rule of Western States Petroleum Association v. Superior Court.
  • The Court cites the California Municipal Law Handbook as authority. That is written and annually updated by a committee of the City Attorneys Department of the League of California Cities and published by Continuing Education of the Bar. [Disclosure: I edit the public finance chapter of the Handbook].

All in all, a helpful case for local governments, holders of their bonds, and those who depend on their services.

The California Supreme Court handed a major victory to former Governor Jerry Brown and California’s governments in a pension reform case today. [Disclosure: I wrote an amicus curiae brief for the League of California Cities in the case.]

This case challenged the 2013 pension reforms, the “California Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013” known as “PEPRA.” The plaintiff unions argued the “California Rule” forbade the Legislature to amend the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (“CERL” or “the 1937 Act”)  to reduce pension benefits without providing an offsetting benefit. Jerry Brown and the California Business Roundtable used the case to try to overturn the California Rule entirely. In a cautious, incremental decision, the Chief Justice wrote for a unanimous court (with a brief concurrence by Justice Cuéllar) ruling as follows:

The California Rule survives, but has this new limitation: the Legislature can make changes to pension benefits which are net negative to employees provided that:

  • They serve a proper purpose that is consistent with the theory of a pension system;
  • They are reasonable;
  • It is not possible to provide offsetting benefits to employees without disserving the legislative purpose.

The crux of the case is this: “The Legislature must have the authority, discretion, and flexibility to address such [pension-spiking] problems without being required to, in effect, extend the life of the loopholes and the opportunities for abuse for the duration of the careers of current employees by providing comparable advantages.”  In short, loophole fixing is okay if a court concludes that is what the Legislature is doing and that it acted reasonably. This will likely mean that every new pension change that is not net-neutral to employees will be litigated, as only a court can confirm these standards are met.

The Court could have ruled more narrowly — just construing the 1937 Act on the basis that the Legislature does not have its own finances at stake under that law as it does under the PERS statute — an argument Lili Wyckoff and I made in an amicus brief for the League of California Cities. It could also have reasoned that PEPRA did not really change anything (as some other amici argued), but the Court chose a broader path. So, this case is good law for CalPERS and not just for 1937 Act pension systems. The Court could have relied only on statutory grounds, or on federal grounds, but decided to reach the state constitutional issue and to rely on state constitutional grounds alone (defeating any petition for cert. to the U.S. Supreme Court).

It could have ruled more broadly, too. The Court expressly rejected the argument that a pension change that affects only accruals to existing employees after the date of the change does not raise a contracts clause issue. Governor Brown and the California Business Roundtable made this unsuccessful argument to overturn the California Rule. So, the California Rule is alive and well, it just has a significant, new limitation.

A few aspects of the decision will affect other areas of public law practice:

  • The case reminds us that government agencies do not have power to make contracts that exceed their statutory (or constitutional) authority, so contracts are construed to imply terms needed to make them lawful. Here, settlement agreements after the 1997 Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs’ Assn. v. Board of Retirement case that promised certain pension benefits are read to include the implied term that those benefits would be provided only so long as they were authorized by statute. Among the cases cited on this point is the land use case public lawyers are familiar with: Trancas Property Owners Assn v. City of Malibu. This aspect of the opinion is also nice authority for the rule that a public agency cannot contract away its police power or other constitutional or statutory authority. The Court also cites Civil Code section 1643, which adopts the canon of construction which prefers readings which make a statute constitutional or a regulation consistent with statute.
  • Litigants cannot estop government (i.e., prevent it from changing a legal position) easily and, given the implied term just noted, estoppel was not shown in this case. Judicial approval of the post-Ventura settlement agreements does not change estoppel analysis.
  • Footnote 4 of the opinion has a useful reminder that “vested right” has at least three meanings — a vested right to some kind of pension after 5 years of public service, a vested right under contracts clause analysis to a particular benefit (say, retiree medical benefits), and vested rights as used in land use law.
  • The plaintiff unions argued their members had paid pension contributions based on calculations which assumed some of the benefits that have now been taken away. In a footnote (18) the Court suggested — but did not decide — that this might entitle them to a refund of premiums. That suggests a whole lot of litigation to come if the issues are not settled.
  • The Court reserves the question “whether the Legislature’s clarification of ambiguous statutory language would avoid contact clause scrutiny.”
  • Reasonable pension expectations vest whether they are rooted in statute or judicial decisions, although prompt legislative disagreement with a judicial construction of a statute is given weight.

Again, a nice win for local government and a big day in California’s law of pensions!

CHW’s quarterly newsletter on public law topics is out. You can see it here.

This issue has articles on:

  • A new ruling of the Federal Communications Commission further expanding federal preemption of local regulation of cell tower and other communications infrastructure;
  • A new decision of the Court of Appeal extending time to sue under the Subdivision Map Act; and,
  • An overview of three recent Court of Appeal decisions affecting local government revenue powers.

We also touch on the firm’s current webinar offerings. You can see that listing here.

Check it out!

 

The California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District held that a city’s approval of a vesting tentative map is binding on the city even if the property covered by the map is located in a coastal zone subject to the jurisdiction of the California Coastal Commission. Other parts of the opinion addressing ripeness and who is the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys’ fees are not addressed in this summary.

In 2010 the voters of the City of Redondo Beach passed an initiative to establish a public-private partnership with a developer to redevelop the City’s waterfront. The City entered into an agreement with Redondo Beach Waterfront, LLC, the developer, to develop a plan pursuant to the initiative. In addition to the land use controls of the City, the proposed project is subject to the jurisdiction of the California Coastal Commission because the development is in a coastal zone.

Since 2010, the developer spent approximately $14 million on planning a new development. In June 2016 the developer applied for approval of a vesting tentative tract map for the development. The City later notified the developer that the tract map was complete and in October 2016 the City passed a resolution stating that the City’s approval of the map conferred a vested right to proceed in substantial compliance with the laws in effect, pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act. In March of 2017, the voters of the City passed another initiative (Measure C), which substantially restricts the amount of development along the waterfront.

After the passage of Measure C, the City and the initiative’s sponsors argued that the development as originally planned could no longer take place due to the passage of the Measure. The developer argued that the rights it earned through the City’s approval of its vesting tentative tract map grant the developer the right to develop as originally planned, regardless of Measure C.

California Government Code Section 66498.1 — part of the Subdivision Map Act — provides that a local agency’s approval of a vesting tentative map guarantees the developer the right to proceed with its development in substantial compliance with the ordinances, policies, and standards in effect at the time the tentative map is approved. This gives developers assurance that the local government cannot change ordinances, policies, and fees applicable to any development covered by the approved map.  The developer argued that because their map was approved prior to the passage of Measure C, Measure C does not apply to the development.

The developer sued the City to enforce the developer’s rights under the vesting tentative map. The trial court found that the developer did have a right to rely upon the map and, therefore, Measure C would not affect the development.

On appeal, the City and the initiative’s sponsors argued that the rights conferred by Section 66498.1 are not applicable to any land located within a coastal zone because such land is subject to the authority of the California Coastal Commission and the California Coastal Act.

The California Coastal Act governs land-use planning for the coastal zones of California. Under the Act, any party seeking to develop in the coastal zone must obtain a coastal development permit in addition to any other applicable local government permits. Regardless of a local government’s approval of a development, the development must comply with the California Coastal Act. The California Coastal Commission also has jurisdiction to review any actions by a local government that could affect development within the coastal zone.

The appeals court rejected the City’s argument. The intent of the Legislature in enacting Section 66498.1 was not to interfere with the California Coastal Act, but instead to give developers some assurance of what rules and fees will be applied by local governments. The court held that although Section 66498.1 does not tie the hands of the California Coastal Commission, that does not mean that a vesting tentative map is not applicable to new local government regulations and fees.

Therefore, while the developer will have to comply with all requirements of the California Coastal Act, whatever those may be in the future, the requirements imposed by Redondo Beach will not change significantly from those that were in effect when the vesting tentative map was approved in 2016.

The Court of Appeal recently affirmed, in North Murrieta Community, LLC v. City of Murrieta, that developers can be held to pay additional impact fees, despite holding a vesting tentative tract map, if a subsequent development agreement allowed for such fees. In 1999, the City of Murrieta approved a vesting tentative map for a development project known as the Golden City Project, developed by North Murrieta Community, LLC.  Four months before the map would expire in 2001, the developer and the City entered into a development agreement covering the project. The development agreement extended the term of the map for 15 additional years. The parties later extended the term of the map until 2019 and the development agreement until 2021.

Development projects can take many years to be completed and over those years regulations and fees imposed by local governments may change as time goes by. Typically, tentative maps and development agreements lock into place regulations and fees that a city may impose on a development project, thereby giving developers some financial certainty about how much the development will cost to create and cities some certainty that the project will develop as planned.

The 2001 Murrieta development agreement, however, specified that the City could, after its effective date, impose new fees on the development if these new fees were part of a generally applicable fee schedule applicable to the entire city, and not just the Golden City development. Acting on that authority years later, the City and the Western Riverside Council of Governments later passed a new fee to help fund local transportation projects, applicable to any development in the City. Under the new ordinance, the City in 2017 charged the developer and their successors in interest a new transportation impact mitigation fee of $541,497. The developer paid the fee under protest and filed suit arguing that the City could not impose the new mitigation fees until the tentative map expired in 2019 and the development agreement expires in 2021. At trial, the court ruled that the City had the right to impose the fees under the terms of the 2001 development agreement.

On appeal, the Second Division of the Fourth District Court of Appeal considered whether a subsequent development agreement can modify rights under a vesting tentative map. Generally, the approval of a vesting tentative map precludes a city from imposing additional conditions or fees that were not in effect at the time the map was approved. However, the 2001 development agreement specifically allowed Murrieta to impose future mitigation fees if the fees are applied throughout the City. The court of appeal ruled that such an agreement can modify the developer’s rights under a vesting tentative map. The court noted that had the City and developer not entered into the development agreement, the developer’s vesting tentative map would have expired. In return for agreeing to extend the term of the map for 15 more years, the City could lawfully secure a development agreement that allowed for future generally applicable fees and fee increases. The court was unsympathetic to the developer’s arguments that the vesting tentative map alone should control, emphasizing the developer negotiated and agreed to the 2001 development agreement. If the developer had not wanted to be subject to future generally applicable new fees, the developer should not have agreed to the language allowing such fees. Therefore, the traffic mitigation fees were applicable to the development. The decision adds to the litany of cases affirming that development agreements can vary general restrictions on a city’s land use power. As the economic cycle shifts to respond to the current uncertain climate, cities may be advised to evaluate development agreements as a tool to preserve future opportunities to fund services for their residents and communities as developers seek vesting tentative tract map extensions and land use entitlement amendments.

It’s 2:00 a.m. A stolen van has been leading officers on a high-speed chase, weaving in and out of traffic, reaching speeds of 100 mph. The van turns onto a dead-end street. When it reaches the dead-end, it makes a multi-point turn, and accelerates toward the officers. Officers need not hesitate; need not give a deadly force warning; need not contemplate alternatives to deadly force. Officer safety — and likely the public’s safety, too — justifies deadly force.

That’s the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion this week in affirming summary judgment for five officers in Monzon v. City of Murrieta finding probable cause to employ deadly force in such dynamic and urgent circumstances, even when officers are not in the path of the oncoming vehicle, and that not every shot must be justified. Maybe more important for lawyers than the holding is the lesson the case teaches on gathering and presenting objective evidence to successfully defend use-of-force suits.

Officers, of course, may exercise deadly force when reasonable under the totality of circumstances (as set forth in Penal Code 835a), and qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or malicious from the need to go to trial. Yet, lawyers’ ability to dispose of an excessive force claim short of trial can be illusive if factual disputes can be argued. Body-worn cameras can be an especially useful tool, as Scott v. Harris, a 2007 SCOTUS opinion, obliges courts to disregard when ruling on summary judgment a plaintiff’s testimony directly contradicted by the objective evidence, including camera evidence.

The Ninth Circuit decided Monzon as it did because of the evidence. There, it was not a body camera that made the difference. Instead, it was the stolen vehicle’s “black box” data recorder. Proof of the vehicle’s speed, its acceleration from a dead stop, and that the brakes were never engaged, allowed the Ninth Circuit to conclude the van posed a threat to the officers sufficient to justify deadly force.

Absent that evidence, one can easily imagine a different result. Monzon thus presents a fresh reminder on the importance of objective evidence  in excessive force cases, and that such evidence is not limited to body cams. Just as black-box data may be powerful evidence in a car accident case so, too, may it “speak[] volumes about what actually occurred” in a use of force case. The same may hold true of other “big data” technologies. So, keep your antenna up for these sources of objective data that can win on summary judgment!

California’s Constitution, like most, requires government to pay just compensation when it takes or damages private property. This has led to the development of two bodies of law — eminent domain (when government sues to acquire property or an interest in it) and inverse condemnation (when property owners sue government alleging property damage). The Legislature has provided detailed statutes to govern eminent domain, but inverse condemnation is mostly judge-made law.

The California Supreme Court had not heard an inverse condemnation case in decades until last August 2019 and it now has decided two in 11 months: City of Oroville v. Superior Court held the City was not liable for a sewer back-up into a suite of dentists’ offices (expensive property to damage!) because the dentists violated the Uniform Plumbing Code by not installing and maintaining a backwater valve. Yesterday, the Court decided Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation, concerning inverse condemnation procedures. [Disclosure: I argued for the governments in the California Supreme Court in both cases.]

We just issued a Bulletin edition of our firm newsletter detailing Weiss. You can find it here.  Check it out!